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Abstract 
We analyse the response of 1,046 companies to the introduction of more rigorous 
environmental management standards by the FTSE4Good Index in 2002. This change 
threatened 388 firms with deletion from the index and prompted an extensive 
programme of company engagement by FTSE. We use this natural experiment to 
contrast the response of firms subject to engagement and facing the threat of deletion 
from the index with a control group comprised of companies that were non-compliant 
with the new standards, but not threatened with deletion or engaged with by FTSE. By 
2005, 49% of the treatment group had adapted to meet the new standards whereas only 
23% of the control group had done so. This result is statistically significant even after 
controlling for environmental risk, industry, country, governance and financial 
performance. Our results are consistent with the proposition that the engagement and 
the threat of deletion from FTSE4Good motivate improvements to corporate 
environmental management practice, especially where the threat of exclusion from the 
index is likely to be costly. 
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Change For Good: The Effect of FTSE4Good Index on 
Environmental Management  
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates whether engagement by and threat of deletion from a well-
recognised corporate responsibility (CR) index can be a significant driver of the adoption 
of enhanced corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices by companies. Recent 
research has raised the debate about the perception of the importance of CR indices in 
this regard among member-companies (Collison et al., 2009; Slager et al., 2009), but is 
inconclusive on this point. However, there is strong evidence that, apart from assessing 
and rewarding companies on their past performance, these indices may have the 
potential of fostering organisational improvements (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010; Slager, 
2009).  
 
Since the adoption and improvement of CSR practices can be a major organisational, 
strategic and financial challenge for the corporate sector, an important question is 
whether a CR index can systematically motivate companies to improve their CSR 
practices. Furthermore, it is important to establish under what circumstances CR indices 
are more or less effective in driving improvement.  
 
We use the FTSE4Good index, one of the most recognised responsible investment 
indices, and its environmental criteria as the empirical setting to explore these questions. 
The largest 2000 or so listed companies in the world are eligible for inclusion in the 
FTSE4Good index, as long as they pass a set of CSR criteria. In 2002, the starting point 
for this study, around 40% of eligible companies met the required FTSE4Good criteria. 
At this time, FTSE4Good announced that it was strengthening its environmental 
management criteria. FTSE gave companies included in the index in 2002 but not 
complying with the new criteria until 2005 to meet its new criteria or to face deletion and 
embarked on an extensive programme of engagement with these companies. On the 
other hand, FTSE did not establish any contact with companies that were eligible but not 
included in the index. We use a sample of eligible companies assessed by FTSE4Good 
both in 2002 and 2005. Out of all companies in our sample that did not comply with the 
new criteria at the time they were announced, 388 were included in the index in 2002 and 
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658 were not. This setting provides a natural experiment where we are able to observe 
the impact of engagement, allied to the threat of exclusion from the FTSE4Good index, 
on environmental management practices.  
 
After controlling for environmental risk, governance, industry and country effects on the 
probability of compliance with the environmental management criteria and the 
probability of inclusion in the FTSE4Good index, it was found that our results are 
consistent with the proposition that the combination of engagement and the threat of 
deletion significantly increase company’s adoption of the environmental management 
practices required by FTSE4Good criteria. We also find that the engagement effect is 
stronger where firms are more likely to be a member of the index and we interpret this as 
reflecting the increased cost of being excluded. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the FTSE4Good index and 
environmental criteria requirements. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Next, the 
hypotheses, methodology and data are described in Section 4, followed by the discussion 
of the main results in Section 5. Conclusions are presented in the last section.  
 
 
2. FTSE4Good Index Series 
 
2.1 General Description 
 
FTSE4Good is a stock-market index series operated by FTSE Group Ltd., a UK-based 
index company jointly owned by the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange. 
For its FTSE4Good Index Series, FTSE uses its standard All-World Developed (AWD) 
Indices as its starting point, but excludes any companies that fail to satisfy FTSE4Good 
CSR criteria. According to the FTSE4Good methodology (FTSE, 2010), the 
FTSE4Good criteria aim to reflect emerging standards of CSR best practice as embodied 
in various authoritative codes (e.g. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) and 
in the practice of leading companies. Criteria are selected and amended by an 
independent Policy Committee comprising various socially responsible investors, CSR 
experts and academics (FTSE, 2005). 
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Research for FTSE4Good is conducted by a specialised non-profit research agency, the 
Experts in Responsible Investment Solutions (EIRIS). EIRIS makes use of information 
published by companies on their websites and CSR reports, and the results of an annual 
survey sent to the companies (FTSE, 2010). Each company’s compliance with the 
FTSE4Good CSR criteria is assessed on a six monthly basis by the FTSE Policy 
Committee, based on recommendations supplied by EIRIS. Decisions are founded on an 
assessment of compliance with FTSE’s rules-based criteria. 
 
FTSE4Good has a commitment to reflect emerging standards of good practice in CSR 
(FTSE, 2010). This means that, as new practices emerge, the Policy Committee has 
steadily increased the extent and rigour of criteria it uses to assess companies. FTSE has 
added several new topics in its ten years of existence - human rights, countering bribery, 
supply chain labour standards, climate change, and health and safety (FTSE, 2010). It has 
also increased the strength and coverage of its criteria. For example, the initial 
environmental criteria required policy, management systems and reporting, but were only 
applied to the companies defined as being at ‘high risk’ on environmental issues. Low 
risk companies did not have to meet any criteria. After 2002, companies were classified 
as High, Medium and Low risk, and all three groups had to meet different levels of 
environmental criteria (FTSE, 2004).  
 
Companies that pass the criteria are informed of their inclusion in the index and receive a 
certificate. While FTSE does not publish the full index list for commercial reasons, every 
six monthly review includes the changes it makes to the index, announcing the names of 
both the companies newly joining the index and those that have been ‘deleted’ from the 
index. The publicity surrounding these announcements can be significant, particularly if a 
major company is deleted from the index. For example, several Japanese newspapers ran 
stories when Toyota was excluded from the index in 2007 on labour rights grounds.  
 
Partly because of the negative publicity effects associated with FTSE4Good, FTSE 
works to ensure that companies are given adequate warning of criteria upgrades and of 
the possibility that they may face deletion from the Index (FTSE, 2010). Furthermore, it 
has adopted the practice of allowing FTSE4Good member companies an extended grace 
period before it enforces criteria changes. During this period FTSE embarks on a 
programme of ‘engagement’ with companies. Affected member companies are notified 
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of criteria upgrades as much as two years in advance of their potential deletion date and 
FTSE sends subsequent reminders during the interim. This often gives rise to extensive 
discussion between the company and FTSE about the nature of criteria requirements and 
their rationale. The simplified model of the criteria upgrade process is presented in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
While FTSE lavishes considerable attention on companies threatened with deletion from 
FTSE4Good, the same is not true of non-member companies. Companies eligible for 
inclusion in FTSE4Good (i.e. those listed on the FTSE AWD Index), but not currently 
meeting the required criteria, do not receive any contact from FTSE in relation to criteria 
upgrades. If these companies wish to enter the index, they must comply with upgraded 
criteria immediately when they are announced (FTSE, 2010). 
  
The regular criteria upgrades mean that most companies in the FTSE4Good index have 
at some point faced the choice between adopting the CSR practices required by the new 
FTSE4Good criteria, or being de-listed from the index. If FTSE4Good is irrelevant to 
company decision-making, then one would expect there to be little or no response to 
changes in FTSE criteria. If, on the other hand, companies wish to remain included in 
the index series and wish to avoid any negative publicity associated with deletion, one 
would expect them to want to use the grace period to adopt the required policies and 
practices to meet the new criteria.  
 
 
2.2 Environmental Criteria 
 
The first step in the FTSE4Good process is to determine what risk rating to accord to 
companies. This is based largely on a firm’s business sector membership. On 
environmental criteria, from 2002, firms are classified as High risk on environmental 
impact (often chemicals, oil and gas or food production), Medium (for example, 
electronics or banks) or Low risk (such as software or telecommunications). Companies 
in different risk bands need to meet different levels of criteria. For environmental 
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management, these include criteria relating to environmental policy, management and 
reportingi.  
 
Policy 
High risk firms’ policy must cover the whole group and meet six indicators of which at 
least four must be core. The core indicators are that policy refers to all key issues, 
responsibility for policy is at board or departmental level, a commitment to the use of 
targets, a commitment to monitoring and audit, a commitment to public reporting. The 
desirable indicators are globally applicable corporate standards, a commitment to 
stakeholder involvement, policy addresses product or service impact, and strategic moves 
towards sustainability. For medium firms policy must cover the whole group and meet at 
least four indicators of which at least three must be core. For low impact companies they 
must have published a policy statement including at least one commitment indicator. 
 
Environmental Management Systems 
For high risk companies where environmental management systems apply to more than 
one third of activities all six indicators must be met and targets quantified. If EMS 
applies to more than two thirds of activities the company must meet five indicators, one 
of which is the requirement for documented objectives and targets in key areas. The 
indicators are the presence of environmental policy, the identification of significant 
impacts, documented objectives and targets in key areas (i.e. outlined processes and 
responsibilities, manuals, action plans and procedures), internal audits against the 
requirements of the system (not limited to legal compliance), and internal reporting and 
management review. ISO14001 certification or EMAS registration is deemed to meet all 
six indicators. Medium risk firms must have EMS covering a third of the company and 
meet four indicators or if EMS covers less than a third they must have six indicators, 
including quantitative objectives and targets. Low impact firms have no management 
requirements. 
 
Reporting 
Medium and low impact firms have no reporting requirements. High risk firms must 
have published a report within the last three years, covering the whole group and meeting 
three core indicators or if not covering the whole group must meet all four core 
                                                        
i Description of the requirements is based on FTSE4Good Index Series Inclusion Criteria (2010). 
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indicators or three core and two desirable indicators. The core indicators are to include 
text of environmental policy, a description of main impacts, quantitative data, and 
performance measured against targets. Desirable indicators comprise an outline of an 
EMS, details of negative events (non-compliance, prosecution, fines and accidents), 
financial dimensions, independent verification, stakeholder dialogue, and coverage of 
sustainability issues. 
 
 
3. Literature review  
 
3.1 Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Many companies devote substantial attention and resources to CSR-related activities and 
programmes (Barnea and Rubin, 2010) in addition to considering social responsibility 
while making investment decisions. Pressure to improve CSR practices comes from 
various institutions such as governmental bodies, pressure and lobby groups, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders (González-Benito and 
González-Benito, 2006). At the same time, investors appear to be more and more 
concerned with the impact by companies on the natural environment and social 
problems (Cox et al., 2004, Kim and Lyon, 2007, O’Rourke, 2003, Reid and Toffel, 2009, 
Renneboog et al., 2008, Sparkes and Cowton, 2004, among others). While the debate on 
the relationship between social and financial performance continuesii, there are other 
important dimensions, apart from the above market-related ones, which influence 
socially responsible organisational behaviour.  
 
While scientists have for decades sought to bring attention to ecological issues, it is 
arguably only relatively recently that the scale of the impact on the environment and its 
consequences has been acknowledged by the financial and industrial community, 
resulting in a substantial increase in the environmental awareness of both business and 
society (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). Further, in the developed world, the initiative 
and relative power of different activist groups and non-governmental organisations has 
                                                        
ii There is substantial interest in establishing whether and how the capital market prices the socially 
responsible behaviour of companies (Mallin et al., 1995, Margolis and Walsh, 2003, Orlitzky et al., 2003, 
Bauer et al., 2005, Kreander et al., 2005, Barnett and Salomon, 2006, Collison et al., 2008). However, the 
detailed review of the topic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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developed and risen significantly (Reid and Toffel, 2009) making companies increasingly 
more responsive to the pressures of private politics. In his application of institutional 
theory to the study of the adoption of corporate responsibility practices, Campbell (2007) 
argues that, among other institutional factors, private non-governmental initiatives, 
institutional investors as well as the press can trigger changes in corporate behaviour 
towards more corporate social responsibility. Related studies explore how different 
processes of social activism can elicit changes in corporate behaviour related to 
sustainability (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Reid and Toffel, 2009). These and other 
drivers of voluntary compliance with CSR principles play an especially significant role in 
situations where some of the regulatory initiatives are transferred to the private sector 
(Bartley, 2003). 
 
 
 
3.2 Ratings and Their Impact on Corporate Behaviour 
 
Among the above-mentioned motivations of voluntary adoption of sustainability 
practices, rankings and ratings are becoming an inseparable and important part of the 
organisational environment (Martins, 2005). Ratings reduce information asymmetry 
between different groups of stakeholders (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010). Such ratings may 
become an important instrument of shaping the CSR behaviour of corporations.  
 
Some previous studies of the ways in which public measures may change organisational 
activity focused on problems related to educational establishments (Elsbach and Kramer, 
1996; Espeland and Sauder, 2007) and found that in the long term rankings can lead to 
internalisation by the organisations of the corresponding ranking criteria (Sauder and 
Espeland, 2009). Recent research has started to examine the impact of rankings on 
companies rather than educational establishments. In particular, Chatterji and Toffel 
(2010) analysed the corporate response to being evaluated against a well-recognised 
environmental rating. They found that companies which are rated poorly on their 
environmental performance by the KLD ratings respond to the rating by improving their 
practices. Moreover, the authors examined two important factors which shape the 
corporate response to the rating. In particular, they conclude that firms with a poorer 
rating are especially likely to improve their CSR behaviour to enhance the rating position 
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if they have opportunities for relatively less costly improvement activities and if they 
operate in a stricter regulatory environment compared to non-rated firms or firms with a 
higher rating position.  
 
As shown in Slager (2009), CSR managers may use membership of a corporate 
responsibility index to respect the increased interest and demand by different stakeholder 
groups for active CSR performance. Moreover, managers feel that the reputation of the 
company would suffer significantly were it to be excluded from the index. Indeed, 
evidence shows that companies often declare such a membership in their CSR reports, 
and the publicity awarded by joining the index or being excluded from can be substantial 
(Collison et al., 2009). In the study of FTSE4Good index, Slager (2009) reported that 
companies reacted positively to being included in the FTSE4Good index and to the 
engagement. The findings also suggested that index criteria become internalised in 
company policy and improve the perception of CSR in general within the company. Both 
studies, therefore, offer an important insight into companies’ perception of FTSE4Good, 
for example, the ‘reputation and the pressure that would be placed on senior managers if 
their company were not included in a new FTSE index’ (Collison et al., 2009: 45). 
Further, Collison et al. (2009) note that a common sentiment of the respondents was that 
the changes in activity were not necessarily directly done ‘for FTSE4Good’, but it was 
suggested that the index does indeed provide a certain benchmark for company’s 
improvement of corporate responsibility practices. Overall, the results indicate that 
FTSE4Good has had some impact on company activity, mainly on reporting and 
monitoring.  
 
Thus, a CR index may achieve the goal of stimulating the changes in mainstreaming 
corporate responsibility practices through increased disclosure by companies of their 
CSR activity and by changing CSR-related policies and management practices such as the 
implementation of a corporate environmental management system (EMS)iii. Such systems 
are shown to enhance the environmental and operations performance and to stimulate 
the implementation of a wider range of available environmental activities (Melnyk et al., 
2003).  
                                                        
iii Corporate environmental management systems (EMS) comprise ‘the formal system and database which 
integrates procedures and processes for the training of personnel, monitoring, summarising, and reporting 
of specialised environmental performance information to internal and external stakeholders of the firm’ 
(Melnyk et al., 2003: 332). 
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Finally, investors are increasingly beginning to consider a company’s attitude and its 
actions towards preservation of the environment and making social input an equally 
important and necessary aspect of corporate strategy (Cox et al., 2004, Kim and Lyon, 
2007, O’Rourke, 2003, Reid and Toffel, 2009, Renneboog et al., 2008, Sparkes and 
Cowton, 2004, among others). However, investors often cannot engage with all 
companies in their portfolios individually. In this case, a corporate responsibility index 
can provide a mechanism of investor-driven engagement towards corporate adoption of 
mainstream social responsibility standards. As stated in Reid and Toffel (2009: 1157), 
‘most empirical research on private politics has focused on the strategies and tactics of 
social activists, but when and how firms respond to these pressures is much less 
understood’. We contribute to the existing literature by empirically testing whether an 
engagement strategy of a well-recognised corporate responsibility index and the threat of 
exclusion from it can efficiently motivate companies to improve their environmental 
management practices. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
Drawing on the prior literature, the following hypotheses are tested in this paper. 
 
Hypothesis 1. FTSE4Good engagement and threat of exclusion have a significant positive 
effect on the corporate adoption of the management practices required for compliance 
with the enhanced environmental criteria. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of engagement/deletion threat is stronger when the threat of 
exclusion is likely to be costly. 
 
We use FTSE4Good archival data to test these hypotheses by reconstructing a natural 
experiment that resulted from the change to FTSE4Good environmental criteria in 2002. 
The sample for the experiment is the 1,046 companies in the FTSE4Good All World 
Developed Index (AWD) and eligible for inclusion in FTSE4Good in both March 2002 
and March 2005. This sample is divided into a treatment group and a control group. The 
treatment group consists of 388 companies that were included in the FTSE4Good index 
in 2002 but failed to meet the enhanced environmental management requirements. This 
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group received notification from FTSE in 2002 that they would have to meet the new 
environmental criteria by 2005 or face deletion from the index. They also received 
repeated contact from FTSE, explaining what the new criteria require and reminding 
them about the deletion deadline. The control group comprised the 658 companies that 
were members of the AWD, but were not included in FTSE4Good in March 2002, and 
also failed to meet the requirements of the new environmental criteria. These companies 
by definition did not face the threat of deletion from the index or the risk of associated 
bad publicity, nor did they receive any contact from FTSE explaining the requirements 
of the new criteria. In the natural experiment we investigate whether the companies in 
the treatment group were more or less likely to adopt the environmental management 
practices required for FTSE4Good inclusion in the three years between 2002 and 2005.  
 
However, a direct contrast of the improvements in environmental management might be 
misleading if those firms that were in the index were closer to complying. This might be 
expected as they met the earlier, albeit undemanding, environmental management 
requirements and also complied with FTSE4Good stakeholder and human rights criteria 
possibly signalling a general commitment to corporate social responsibility. 
 
We therefore model the probability of meeting the new requirements using the full set of 
firms assessed by FTSE4Good and including environmental risk indicators (High, 
Medium and Low) identified by the two zero-one dummy variables High and Medium, a 
governance indicator (based on compliance with the FTSE4Good stakeholder criteria), 
industry membership and country.  
 
02
0 1 2 3
34 23
1 1
...j j j j
n j m j j
n m
Met a a High a Medium a Stake
i Industry c Country e
= =
= + + + +
+ +∑ ∑             (1) 
 
Met02 is a dummy variable where one indicates compliance with the new environmental 
standards for firm j, High and Medium indicate the FTSE4Good risk assessment as high 
or medium, Stake indicates compliance with the FTSE4Good stakeholder requirements 
and Industry and Country indicate membership of a particular industry n or residing in a 
particular country m. The importance to control for industry and country differences is 
derived from prior research (Melnyk et al., 2003, Neumayer and Perkins, 2004, González-
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Benito and González-Benito, 2006, among others). The model successfully classified 
76% percent of the cases and predicts a probability of complying with the environmental 
requirements given industry, country, risk and governance. Ten industry indicators, 5 
country indicators, High and Stake were statistically significant at 5%. Two countries are 
excluded from the analysis as all firms in those countries do not meet the environmental 
criteria. The model was tested for sensitivity to a size measure (log of market 
capitalisation), financial metrics (market-to-book, price-to-earnings, return on equity and 
equity returns) and ownership measures (percentage of closely held and free float equity). 
The data was collected from Datastream. None of these measures were statistically 
significant. Our variable PMet02 is the fitted value from the logit regression and indicates 
the probability, from 0 to 1, of company j meting the environmental requirements in 
2002. 
 
We also use a variable that indicates the probability of membership of the FTSE4Good 
index. This is estimated from a simplified version of the environmental compliance 
model with the environmental risk indicators, High and Medium removed and the Stake 
variable also dropped as all firms which do not meet the stakeholder criteria are excluded 
from the index. 
 
34 23
02
0
1 1
j n j m j j
n m
Index a i Industry c Country e
= =
= + + +∑ ∑     (2) 
 
The model correctly classifies 73 percent of the cases and 10 industry and 13 country 
indicators are statistically significant. Our variable PInd02 is the fitted value from the logit 
regression and indicates the probability, from 0 to 1, of company j being in the 
FTSE4Good index in 2002. 
 
Our test equation models compliance with the new environmental standards in 2005 
controlling for risk, governance and the probability of compliance in 2002 and 
engagement from FTSE4Good.  
 
05 02
0 1 2 3 4 5
02
6
...j j j j j j
j j j
Met b b High b Medium b Stake b PMet b Engage
b PMet Engage e
= + + + + + +
× +
               (3) 
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Met05 indicates compliance with the environmental regulations in 2005, where High, 
Medium and Stake are as for equation 1, PMet02 indicates the probability of complying with 
the environmental requirements in 2002 and Engage identifies firms in the treatment 
group, facing the threat of deletion and receiving FTSE engagement. The interaction 
term between probability of meeting new environmental management requirements in 
2002 and engagement/threat of deletion aims to capture the relative effect of 
engagement/threat of deletion given how close the company is to complying with the 
new requirements. As the risk and governance indicators were included in equation 1 the 
probability variable PMet02 may capture any impact so the models are estimated with and 
without each of the control variables. 
 
Finally, the extension of the test equation includes the probability of being in the 
FTSE4Good index in 2002. 
 
05 02
0 1 2 3 4 5
02 02 02
6 7 8
...j j j j j j
j j j j j j
Met b b High b Medium b Stake b PMet b Engage
b PMet Engage b PIndex b PIndex Engage e
= + + + + + +
× + + × +
   (4) 
 
As in equation 3, the probability variable PMet02 may capture any impact of the risk and 
governance indicators so the models are estimated with and without each of the control 
variables. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
1,602 firms were evaluated according to the FTSE4Good environmental standards in 
2002 of which 452 complied with the new criteria and 666 were in the index. However, 
some of the firms were disqualified from consideration for the FTSE4Good index 
membership as their business fell outside accepted criteria and we therefore removed 
these firms from the sample. This left few firms in the tobacco, aerospace and defence 
industries so the remaining firms in those categories were also removed leaving 1,454 
firms with 405 complying and 665 in the index. We use this sample to estimate the 
probability of compliance in 2002. The geographical and industrial distributions are 
presented in the Appendix in Table A1 and Table A2 respectively. The 1,049 firms that 
did not comply in 2002 include 660 outside the index and 389 within. Of these we do not 
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have a result for the final 2005 compliance for 3 companies leaving 1,046 firms of which 
388 were in the index. This is our test sample.  
 
As Table 1 shows there is a substantial difference between the control and treatment 
groups. The treatment group has 49% compliance whist the control group only achieves 
23%. The difference is highly significant using a conventional chi2 test and is consistent 
with a substantial FTSE4Good engagement/threat of deletion effect. About 100 firms, 
close to 10% of the sample, would not have complied with improved environmental 
management had the compliance rate been the same for the treatment group as the for 
the control group. 
 
Table 1 
 
However, Table 1 also shows that there are more high risk firms in the control group 
(49%) compared to the treatment group (5%), there is a higher percentage of firms 
predicted to comply with environmental management at 2002 in the treatment group 
(16%) compared to the control group (8%), there is a higher percentage of firms in the 
treatment group which are predicted to be included in the index (87%) than in the 
control group (31%) and all of the treatment group complied with the stakeholder 
requirement in 2002 whereas only 35% of the control group do so.  Each classification 
reveals statistically significant differences and in each instance a clear case could be made 
to expect a stronger move towards compliance for the treatment group irrespective of 
the FTSE4Good engagement/deletion threat. It is more difficult for the high-risk firms 
in the control group to meet the more demanding requirements, there are more firms 
that would be expected to have already complied within the treatment group, the 
incentive to match the index inclusion of competitors is stronger in the treatment group, 
and higher compliance with stakeholder requirements in the treatment group both 
implies better governance and the possibility of easier inclusion in the index. 
 
In Table 2 we report the tests of the impact of engagement/threat of deletion on 
compliance after controlling for the environmental risk aspects of the firms, their 
probability of having already complied with the environmental management 
requirements, despite not having done so, and their compliance with the FTSE4Good 
stakeholder requirements. At this stage engagement cannot be separated into engagement 
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and threat of expulsion. All firms included in the treatment group are also in the index 
and would be excluded if they failed to comply. The results in Table 2 cannot separate 
the two influences. The High and Medium risk dummies and the stakeholder compliance 
dummy were included in the calculation of the probability of complying with the 
environmental requirements at 2002 but are included here in case the influence on new 
compliance differs from that on 2002 compliance. To isolate the influence of the 
probability of compliance and the stakeholder compliance we introduce these control 
variables in different combinations.  
 
Table 2 
 
Our results show that high-risk firms are less likely to comply and although the 
coefficient on high risk is less risky than that on medium risk they are not statistically 
significantly different. We also see that the probability of compliance is positively and 
significantly related to subsequent compliance. The coefficient on the stakeholder 
compliance variable is only significant where the probability of compliance is also 
included and the probability variable is a function of stakeholder compliance. Under all 
specifications the engagement/deletion threat coefficient is strongly and significantly 
positive. This is consistent with the threat of FTSE4Good deletion combined with FTSE 
engagement encouraging companies to adopt the practices required by the upgraded 
FTSE4Good criteria.  
 
In the final column we investigate the interaction of engagement/deletion threat with 
probability of compliance to examine whether engagement is more effective for those 
firms that were more likely to have complied in the past but our results are insignificant. 
 
In Table 3 we report the results that include the probability of a firm being included in 
the FTSE4Good index as in 2002. The rationale is that those firms with competitors in 
the index, or a national environment that expects FTSE4Good compliance, may more 
concerned about index membership than others. If so, the strength of the index deletion 
threat should be stronger for these firms. We report results which simply include 
engagement/deletion threat and the index probability measure, the index and 
environmental compliance probability measures, both of these with the additional 
control variables of high and medium risk and stakeholder compliance and finally all 
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components of the model. Where the engagement/deletion threat variable is excluded 
the index probability measure is positive and significant, marginally so in column four. It 
is considerably less strong than the environmental probability measure and under all 
circumstances the engagement/deletion threat measure is strongly positive and 
significant. These results do not provide support for the view that firms expected to be 
in the FTSE4Good index are driven by the possibility of exclusion from that index. 
 
Table 3 
 
In the final Table we present the refinement where we interact engagement/deletion 
threat with the probability of membership of the index. The model is run with various 
sets of control variables including the interaction between engagement and the 
probability of meeting the environmental criteria. The results for all variables apart from 
engagement and the engagement-index interaction are consistent with earlier results. 
However when the engagement-index interaction term is included it is significantly 
positive, albeit marginally so in the first set of results where control variables are 
excluded. Wherever the engagement variable is included it is now insignificant. This is 
consistent with engagement working where firms expect to be in the index and less well 
elsewhere. In other words engagement appears to be stronger when the threat of 
exclusion is more effective. However, in Table 3 we saw that in a head to head test 
engagement dominated index probability.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
During the period under review (2002-2005), 345 out of 1046 large firms from around 
the world moved to comply with environmental management practices as specified by 
FTSE4Good. Presumably some would have improved their environmental management 
without FTSE engagement and/or threat of exclusion from the FTSE4Good index. We 
cannot evaluate precisely the impact of the encouragement but if the same proportion of 
firms from the treatment group had complied as from the control group we would have 
about 100 fewer firms complying with the strong environmental management practice 
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required for FTSE4Good membership in 2005. The companies in treatment group 
include some of the biggest, best known global companies – such as Apple, Carrefour, 
Fiat, Gap, HSBC, Mazda, Peugeot, Siemens, Verizon and Walt Disney. While our 
method doesn’t prove that any of these companies adopted new environmental practices 
as a result of FTSE4Good engagement/deletion threat, it is likely that some of them did. 
 
In addition, we see that firms facing higher environmental risk are less likely to meet the 
more demanding requirements they face than firms with lower risk, firms which meet 
stakeholder requirements are more likely to comply although we cannot separate the 
impact of good governance from increased impact of the index incentive given the 
partial compliance implied by meeting the stakeholder criteria, and firms which fit the 
profile of firms that have typically complied with the environmental criteria are more 
likely to do so than others. 
 
Crucially, firms that meet the engagement criteria are significantly more likely to comply 
than others although at first sight we cannot separate the engagement effect from the 
threat of exclusion from the index. The probability of inclusion in the index, which we 
hypothesise will be positively associated with the costs of exclusion, is not independently 
related to the propensity to comply. However, when we interact engagement with the 
probability of inclusion we find that engagement works for those firms that ought to be 
included in the index and not otherwise. We interpret this as an indication that it is not a 
question of whether engagement works or threat of exclusion but they are 
complimentary.  
 
Overall, the results present evidence of the effectiveness of a corporate responsibility 
index as a driver of improved CSR practices by the companies. The evidence can be 
further tested by looking at the other changes FTSE has introduced to its criteria in the 
last 10 years – on human rights, countering bribery, labour standards and climate change. 
Preliminary analysis suggests that a similar pattern may be observed. Further research 
could also explore the extent to which management practices required by FTSE4Good 
really deliver positive social and environmental outcomes and how the activity of the 
corporate responsibility index can be made more efficient. In particular, if investors were 
to explicitly support FTSE4Good by expressing concern to companies about their poor 
ratings, would that amplify the effect? This research could be expanded to study whether 
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FTSE4Good could be used to drive adoption of CSR practices in a wider range of 
companies, for example, in emerging markets. Other questions could be related to the 
extent to which the CSR practices required by a CR index could be made more 
demanding so that they motivate more substantial changes in corporate behaviour.  
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Figure 1. Model of FTSE4Good criteria upgrade process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
The figure schematically presents the process of criteria upgrade and the engagement with 
companies which are members of the index. When new criteria appear or existing criteria are 
upgraded, companies which were members of the index at the moment of new criteria 
announcement are contacted in advance and informed about the coming upgrade and potential 
threat of deletion from the index. Furthermore, the member companies may receive a grace 
period or schedule before the end of the implementation of the changes and other forms of  
engagement from FTSE4Good such as consultations and discussions about the new criteria. 
Companies not part of the index are not contacted. If these companies wish to enter the index, 
they must comply with upgraded criteria immediately when they are announced.  
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Table 1. Compliance with FTSE4Good environmental management criteria in 2005
 Control (n=658) Treatment (n=388)
Abstain 504 197
Comply 154 191
Chi2=73.63, p=0.000 
High 325 21
Medium 232 262
Low 101 105
Chi2=213.53, p=0.000 
Predict Abstain 606 324
Predict Comply 52 64
Chi2=18.27, p=0.000 
Predict Out 452 50
Predict In 206 338
Chi2=304.54, p=0.000 
Stakeholder not met 426 0
Stakeholder met 232 388
Chi2=423.79, p=0.000 
 
Notes 
The table presents the distribution of compliance with new environmental criteria between 
Engagement and Control groups. Treatment group includes 388 firms from the test sample 
(1,046 firms) which were in the index and did not comply in 2002. Control group includes 
658 firms which were outside the index and did not comply in 2002. Abstain denotes not 
complying in 2005 and Comply denotes moving to meet new environmental criteria in 
2005. High, Medium and Low present distribution of the firms with the corresponding 
environmental risk. Predict Abstain and Predict Comply present the number of firms which 
are predicted to comply/not with environmental management in 2002 (based on equation 
1). Predict Out and Predict In presents the number of firms which are predicted to be 
included in/be out of the index. Stakeholder not met and Stakeholder met present 
compliance with stakeholder criterion requirements. In each case, the significance of the 
differences is estimated using the chi2 test.  
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Table 2. Regression results: dependent variable: compliance in 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  
Constant  -0.829  -1.740  -0.864  -1.684   -1.777 
  (4.75)  (8.51)  (4.90)  (8.29)   (8.23) 
  
High  -0.293  -0.561  -0.353  -0.421   -0.431 
  (1.41)  (2.48)  (1.53)  (1.75)   (1.77) 
  
Medium  -0.639  -0.618  -0.640  -0.613   -0.624 
  (3.53)  (3.23)  (3.54)  (3.19)   (3.26) 
  
Engage  1.246  1.017  1.106  1.389   1.715 
  (7.82)  (5.99)  (4.53)  (5.31)   (4.61) 
  
PMet02   4.703   4.935   5.465 
   (10.63)   (10.66)   (8.90) 
  
Stake    0.179  -0.492   -0.567 
    (0.81)  (2.03)   (2.19) 
  
PMet02 X Engage       -1.200 
       (1.31) 
  
Observations  1046  1029  1046  1029   1029 
pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.17  0.07  0.18   0.18 
Wald chi-squared      81.64     172.53      82.68     171.46      181.04 
Log-pseudolikelihood -   620.19 -   539.35 -   619.81 -   536.99  -   536.09 
Correctly classified, % 69 74 69 74 75
Notes      
The table represents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with upgraded environmental 
criteria in 2005 (Met05) on a set of independent variables.  
The estimated model is: 
 
05 02 02
0 1 2 3 4 5 6j j j j j j j j jMet b bHigh b Medium b Stake b PMet b Engage b PMet Engage e= + + + + + + × +
 
The main explanatory variables include receiving engagement from FTSE4Good and threat of 
deletion (Engage), probability of compliance with environmental criterion in 2002 (PMet02) and the 
interaction term between probability of compliance and engagement/deletion threat (PMet02 X 
Engage) to account for the relative effect of engagement/deletion threat given how close the 
company is to complying. The control variables include high environmental risk (High), medium 
environmental risk (Med) and meeting stakeholder criterion (Stake). Columns (1)-(5) present 
different model specifications. The absolute t-statistics are given underneath in parentheses. The 
coefficients significant at 5% are marked bold. 
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Table 3. Regression results: dependent variable: compliance in 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  
Constant -1.090 -2.429 -0.748 -1.760 -1.736
 (7.38) (12.32) (3.35) (7.05) (6.89)
  
Engage 1.238 1.156  1.363
 (7.25) (4.56)  (4.96)
  
PInd02 -0.284 1.270 -0.288 0.688 0.134
 (0.85) (4.25) (0.85) (1.97) (0.35)
  
PMet02 4.885 4.775 4.941
 (11.23) (10.29) (10.58)
  
High -0.401 -0.858 -0.400
 (1.71) (3.94) (1.65)
  
Medium -0.647 -0.571 -0.613
 (3.56) (3.16) (3.20)
  
Stake 0.202 0.268 -0.504
 (0.92) (1.58) (2.07)
  
Observations 1045 1028 1045 1028 1028
pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.18
Wald chi-squared 71.06 133.33 83.36 149.19 170.19
Log-pseudolikelihood -   625.85 -   560.16 -   618.66 -   551.72 -   536.81
Correctly classified, % 67 74 68 74 75
Notes      
The table represents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with upgraded environmental 
criteria in 2005 (Met05) on a set of independent variables.  
The estimated model is: 
 
05 02 02
0 1 2 3 4 5 6j j j j j j j jMet b b High b Medium b Stake b PMet b Engage b PIndex e= + + + + + + +
  
The main explanatory variables include receiving engagement from FTSE4Good and threat of 
deletion (Engage), probability of compliance with environmental criterion in 2002 (PMet02) and 
probability of being in the index in 2002 (PInd02). The control variables include high environmental 
risk (High), medium environmental risk (Medium) and meeting stakeholder criterion (Stake). 
Columns (1)-(5) present different model specifications. The absolute t-statistics are given 
underneath in parentheses. The coefficients significant at 5% are marked bold. 
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Table 4. Regression results: dependent variable: compliance in 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  
Constant -0.957 -2.088 -0.506 -1.493 -1.498
 (6.03) (10.55) (2.13) (5.88) (5.76)
  
Engage 0.421 0.0615  0.188
 (0.92) (0.12)  (0.32)
  
PInd02 -0.687 -0.401 -0.849 -0.523 -0.423
 (1.71) (0.90) (2.06) (1.17) (0.94)
  
PInd02 X Engage 1.454 1.812 1.867 2.475 1.991
 (1.93) (5.38) (2.40) (4.88) (2.21)
  
PMet02 4.697 5.248 4.959
 (10.75) (9.14) (10.53)
  
High -0.513 -0.571 -0.512
 (2.17) (2.40) (2.10)
  
Medium -0.701 -0.683 -0.665
 (3.82) (3.54) (3.43)
  
Stake 0.246 -0.444 -0.460
 (1.12) (1.90) (1.89)
  
PMet02 X Engage -0.664 
 (0.84) 
  
Observations 1045 1028 1045 1028 1028
pseudo R-sq 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.18 0.18
Wald chi-squared 73.45 155.27 88.88 174.44 170.33
Log-pseudolikelihood -   623.98 -   542.72 -   615.78 -   533.93 -   534.23
Correctly classified, % 68 75 68 75 74
Notes      
The table represents the results of a logistic regression of compliance with upgraded environmental 
criteria in 2005 (Met05) on a set of independent variables.  
The estimated model is: 
05 02
0 1 2 3 4 5
02 02 02
6 7 8
...j j j j j j
j j j j j j
Met b b High b Medium b Stake b PMet b Engage
b PMet Engage b PIndex b PIndex Engage e
= + + + + + +
× + + × +  
 
The main explanatory variables include receiving engagement from FTSE4Good and threat of 
deletion (Engage), probability of compliance with environmental criterion in 2002 (PMet02), 
probability of being in the index in 2002 (PInd02) and two interaction terms (PInd02 X Engage and  
PMet02 X Engage) to account for the relative effect of engagement/deletion threat. The control 
variables include high environmental risk (High), medium environmental risk (Medium) and meeting 
stakeholder criterion (Stake). Columns (1)-(5) present different model specifications. The absolute 
t-statistics are given underneath in parentheses. The coefficients significant at 5% are marked bold.
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1. Geographical distribution of the original sample 
Country Freq. Percent Met02 Met05 Ind02 Ind05 
Australia 49 3.37 0.143 0.347 0.286 0.347 
Austria 7 0.48 0.143 0.429 0.571 0.429 
Belgium 12 0.83 0.250 0.417 0.583 0.583 
Canada 65 4.47 0.185 0.453 0.554 0.429 
Denmark 10 0.69 0.400 0.700 0.800 0.600 
Finland 5 0.34 0.800 1.000 1.000 1.000 
France 33 2.27 0.152 0.848 0.576 0.758 
Germany 30 2.06 0.600 0.767 0.733 0.767 
Greece 10 0.69 0.000 0.600 0.700 0.700 
Hong Kong 43 2.96 0.047 0.070 0.070 0.047 
Ireland 7 0.48 0.000 0.143 0.571 0.286 
Italy 24 1.65 0.083 0.417 0.458 0.375 
Japan 280 19.26 0.404 0.689 0.175 0.493 
Netherlands 16 1.1 0.375 0.688 0.625 0.688 
New Zealand 19 1.31 0.158 0.368 0.105 0.421 
Norway 7 0.48 0.571 0.857 0.714 0.857 
Portugal 6 0.41 0.167 0.167 0.333 0.167 
Singapore 31 2.13 0.032 0.097 0.065 0.097 
Spain 13 0.89 0.231 0.462 0.231 0.462 
Sweden 21 1.44 0.714 0.905 0.571 0.857 
Switzerland 14 0.96 0.571 0.857 0.714 0.714 
UK 403 27.72 0.347 0.623 0.591 0.633 
USA 349 24 0.152 0.277 0.550 0.539 
Total 1,454 100 0.279 0.511 0.457 0.535 
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Table A2. Industrial distribution of the original sample 
Sector Freq. Percent Met02 Met05 Ind02 Ind05
Automobiles & Parts 32 2.2 0.438 0.719 0.531 0.625
Banks 106 7.29 0.142 0.453 0.698 0.632
Beverages 23 1.58 0.304 0.652 0.696 0.609
Chemicals 62 4.26 0.548 0.742 0.210 0.597
Construction & Building Materials 70 4.81 0.186 0.443 0.129 0.343
Diversified Industrials 23 1.58 0.174 0.217 0.174 0.261
Electricity 17 1.17 0.294 0.563 0.353 0.563
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 56 3.85 0.464 0.768 0.411 0.519
Engineering & Machinery 44 3.03 0.386 0.591 0.364 0.523
Food & Drug Retailers 23 1.58 0.130 0.174 0.261 0.304
Food Producers & Processors 44 3.03 0.205 0.273 0.159 0.273
Forestry & Paper 16 1.1 0.625 0.625 0.438 0.625
General Retailers 73 5.02 0.151 0.278 0.589 0.458
Health 39 2.68 0.231 0.462 0.615 0.538
Household Goods & Textiles 35 2.41 0.314 0.629 0.429 0.514
Information Technology Hardware 70 4.81 0.414 0.681 0.457 0.662
Insurance 46 3.16 0.283 0.543 0.717 0.739
Leisure & Hotels 39 2.68 0.026 0.308 0.590 0.513
Life Assurance 23 1.58 0.217 0.435 0.739 0.565
Media & Entertainment 75 5.16 0.213 0.480 0.587 0.587
Mining 13 0.89 0.231 0.308 0.231 0.231
Oil & Gas 55 3.78 0.309 0.436 0.218 0.273
Personal Care & Household Products 18 1.24 0.500 0.722 0.556 0.556
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 54 3.71 0.333 0.537 0.352 0.537
Real Estate 54 3.71 0.333 0.444 0.389 0.453
Software & Computer Services 59 4.06 0.254 0.542 0.458 0.593
Speciality & Other Finance 66 4.54 0.106 0.288 0.545 0.515
Steel & Other Metals 17 1.17 0.471 0.706 0.294 0.529
Support Services 68 4.68 0.235 0.618 0.544 0.662
Telecommunication Services 45 3.09 0.356 0.778 0.689 0.844
Transport 69 4.75 0.232 0.478 0.377 0.500
Utilities - Other 20 1.38 0.500 0.650 0.450 0.632
Total 1,454 100 0.279 0.511 0.457 0.535
 
 
 
